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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the real demand for money in three South Asian 
Countries – Bangladesh, India and Pakistan – allowing for the possible effect of foreign 
exchange inflows (which have tended to increase in recent years). As identifying the 
stability of estimated elasticities is an important concern, we employ cointegration 
analyses allowing for structural breaks. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the real demand for money, i.e. the money demand 
function (MDF), in three South Asian Countries – Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. One of 
the most important issues in this literature is whether the parameters of the MDF are 
stable. A stable MDF is crucial to the theory and application of macroeconomic policies 
as it provides a reliable and predictable link between changes in monetary aggregates and 
changes in variables included in the MDF (Siddiki, 2000a; Deadman et al., 1981; 
Ericsson, 1998; Ghatak, 1995; Judd et al., 1982).  A stable MDF is particularly important 
in the context of the three South Asian countries as they have recently undergone 
financial liberalisation, targeting monetary growth in order to increase saving and the 
level and efficiency of investment to support increased economic growth and living 
standards. To test for stability in our analysis, we use cointegration analysis with 
structural breaks following Gregory and Hansen (1996). 
The analysis is based on quarterly data from the mid-1970s to early 2000s, which 
therefore includes the period since the early 1990s when these countries, to a greater or 
lesser extent, implemented economic reforms. This suggests the desirability of allowing 
for structural breaks. Some of the reforms may impact directly on the MDF, such as 
financial liberalisation facilitating a more „market determined‟ interest rate. Others may 
have an indirect effect via money supply, in particular opening up of the economy so that 
the level of foreign exchange inflows increases. Trade liberalisation is expected to 
ultimately increase incentives to exporters; if the balance of payments improves there is 
an increase in foreign exchange inflows. More importantly, in this context, liberalisation 
of investment and the capital account may increase inflows of foreign exchange through 
foreign direct investment (FDI) or private capital. 
The ability of the monetary authorities to accommodate foreign exchange inflows 
has implications for money demand and monetary policy. We address this issue by 
examining the pass-through effect from foreign exchange inflows to money demand. A 
complete pass-through occurs when an increase in foreign exchange inflows is fully 
reflected in a rise in the monetary base without affecting net domestic monetary assets: 
the concerned government or central bank is unable to adjust (i.e. control) net domestic 
assets through its sterilisation programmes. On the other hand, no pass-through effect 
indicates that an increase in foreign exchange inflows is offset by a reduction of net 
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domestic assets, implying that the government has complete control on domestic assets to 
accommodate foreign inflows. Incorporating this in the money demand function permits 
us to consider the effects of external liberalisation. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005), which includes references to the existing 
literature on Asian economies, is the closest in spirit to the current study (although they 
do not consider foreign exchange inflows). Their primary concern is that finding 
cointegration does not in itself ensure parameter stability, especially in the presence of 
structural breaks, so long-run estimates need to be augmented by short-run dynamics. 
They estimate the MDF for seven Asian economies, including India and Pakistan but not 
Bangladesh, using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method as this allows one 
to combine stationary and non-stationary variables and obviates the need to test for unit 
roots. From our perspective, their main finding is that while the MDF for the M1 
monetary aggregate is cointegrated with stable elasticities for India, for Pakistan stability 
is only found for the M2 measure. Hossain (1996) and Siddiki (2000a) are among the few 
studies that estimate the demand for money in Bangladesh, but neither examines the 
impact of foreign exchange inflows nor allows for regime shifts. In addition, the 
coefficient on income (the marginal propensity to consume, MPC) in Siddiki (2000a) is 
3.26 and in Hossain (1996) within the range of 2.64-3.96. These high values of MPC are 
economically less plausible and not sustainable in the long-run.  
This paper contributes to the literature by including foreign exchange inflows and 
allowing for regime shifts. Tests for cointegration that follow Engle and Granger (1986) 
presume that the cointegrating vector is time-invariant, the long-run equilibrium 
represents a stable underlying relationship. This is not appropriate if the relationship 
between the variables of interest experiences a structural break within the sample period. 
Identifying the existence of such regime shifts is important as unacknowledged regime 
changes might lead to mis-specification bias in model estimation and to mis-diagnosis of 
the time-series properties of the data. Cointegration with regime shifts is particularly 
important for the South Asian countries that have recently undertaken financial and 
external liberalisation. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of relevant 
financial and economic policies and trends in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. In section 
3, we explain the theory and model specification used in the analysis, specifically the 
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method of cointegration analysis with regime shifts. We estimate a standard MDF where 
real money demand is determined by real income and interest rates, augmented with real 
foreign capital inflows. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results while 
Section 5 draws conclusions and policy implications. 
   
2. Overview of Economic Policy in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan  
The aim of this section is not to review macroeconomic policy in any detail but rather to 
discuss the most important policy reforms that may have implications for money demand 
in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Each country is considered in turn, and the section 
includes a discussion of trends in the variables used in the subsequent analysis. The 
following graphs include the real money supply (M1 and M2) in Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan. Structural breaks are apparent for M1 in 1982 and 1990 in Bangladesh and for 
M1 in 1975 in Pakistan but not obvious in India.  
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2. 1 Bangladesh
1
  
Historically, Bangladesh has had an underdeveloped and inefficient financial system with 
low levels of intermediation, tight state control (including government ownership of the 
largest banks and nominal interest rates controlled and fixed by the Bangladesh Bank, the 
central bank) and a lack of competition.  The controlled regime from 1971 to 1986 
exhibited a variety of features of financial repression, in particular government over-
borrowing and directed credit towards „preferential‟ sectors, while controlled nominal 
interest rates with high inflation resulted in negative real interest rates for most of the 
period. Repressive interest rate policies were an instrument to limit the strain on the 
government budget, yet budget deficits remained around 7-9% during 1971-1995 
(Siddiki, 2000a). The high rate of inflation with administratively determined lower levels 
of nominal interest rates caused real interest rates to be negative until 1985. Liberalisation 
began slowly from 1986, and had fairly rapid effects on interest rates (real rates were 
mostly positive after 1986) but a slower impact on the budget deficit, which only fell to 3-
6% during 1997 -2005 (ADB, 2005: 27). 
 
Financial markets have been relatively inefficient at financial intermediation: average 
interest rate spreads (the difference between prime lending and commercial bank deposit 
rates) have been high relative to other countries since 1990 (IMF, 2005: 6), while broad 
money as a per cent of GDP has been consistently below the average for low-income and 
other South Asian countries throughout the period 1976–2003. Since the late 1990s, 
however, interest rate spreads have declined and the broad money ratio has risen as the 
economy has become more monetized. These positive outcomes of banking and financial 
sector reforms are also reflected in lower rates of inflation (from six percent in 1987-1995 
to four percent in 1996-2003) and higher GDP growth rates (from 3.8% in 1976-85 to 4.8 
percent in 1996-2003 and above 5% more recently).  
 
Capital inflows have always been important for Bangladesh, although the composition 
has changed – the importance of foreign aid has declined since the 1970s whereas 
remittances have risen to more than six percent of GDP in 2004. The country also 
received large amounts of foreign assistance over the past 30 years, though this has fallen 
                                               
1  This section is based on Siddiki (2000a) and IMF (2005) if not stated otherwise.   
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off since the mid-1990s. The levels of FDI have always been low, partly because 
Bangladesh has been a relatively closed economy (IMF, 2005: 7) but perhaps largely 
because of the lack of attractive investment opportunities. Restrictive exchange rate 
policies may have deterred capital inflows: the fixed exchange rate policy of 1971-1979, 
associated with black market premiums (as a percentage of unofficial rates) as high as 
49%, was replaced by a “managed flexible” regime in 1979 (Rahman, 1993; Cowitt, 
1996), although black market premiums rose to about 66% in 1985-1992. In April 1994, 
restrictions on most current account transactions were lifted and further liberalisation 
measures were implemented (GOB, 1995; World Bank, 1995), reflected in a decline in 
premiums from to about 30% in 1993-1995. However, it is only as recently as May 2003 
that Bangladesh floated the Taka and could claim to have a liberalised exchange rate. In 
summary, at least until the mid-1990s, Bangladesh can be characterised by high levels of 
financial repression, low openness, high black market premiums and low levels of saving, 
investment and real GDP growth.  
 
2.2 India
2
 
 
Although India had a relatively liberal financial policy in the 1950s, it can be described as 
a relatively closed (to trade and investment) and controlled (in terms of financial and 
exchange rate policy) economy until the early 1990s, and a largely planned economy 
during the 1950s and 1960s (Demetriades and Luintel, 1997; Joshi and Little, 1994; Sen 
and Vaidya, 1998). While some liberalisation began in the mid 1980s, most 
commentators date liberalisation from 1991, although imports of consumer goods are still 
restricted: tariffs, especially in agriculture, remain among the highest in the world, foreign 
exchange is strictly regulated (World Bank, 1994: 224; IMF, 1997) and black market 
premia are high (Siddiki, 2000b). Reforms since 1991 saw a reduction in non-agricultural 
tariffs and removal of exchange rate controls and trade liberalisation had a visible effect 
on trade performance (Panagariya, 2004): the ratio of total exports of goods and services 
to GDP almost doubled from 7.3 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 2000.    
 
                                               
2
 This section is largely based on Siddiki (2000b) and Daly and Siddiki (2002). 
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Financial repression, as indicated by quantitative controls on financial intermediation, 
seignorage (Kletzer and Kohli, 2001: 21), preferential interest rates and reserve 
requirements (cash reserves and statutory liquidity ratios), increased from 1969 through 
1984 and only began to decline after 1988 (Demetriades and Luintel, 1997). The 
Government of India nationalised the 14 largest commercial banks in 1969 and another 
six in 1980, with public sector banks accounting for 86% of deposits in 1970 and 92% 
after 1980 (when directed credit amounted to 40% of total credit), in line with the aim for 
„social control‟ over commercial banks (Demetriades and Luintel, 1997; Joshi and Little, 
1994; Sen and Vaidya, 1998). From the late 1980s the financial sector was gradually 
liberalised, with removal of ceilings on lending rates in 1989 and concessionary lending 
rates in 1990 (Demetriades and Luintel, 1997).   
 
Reforms have been gradual but sustained since 1991: interest rates have been deregulated, 
controls on capital inflows have been relaxed, the rupee has been made convertible for 
current account transactions and during the 1990s „restrictions on foreign direct 
investment, portfolio borrowing, and foreign equity ownership have been relaxed‟ 
(Kletzer, 2004: 236). Such reforms have helped to reverse the adverse effects of financial 
repression and have encouraged an increase in capital inflows – international reserves 
increased from some two per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 16% in 2002-03 (Kletzer, 2004: 
254). Joshi and Sanyal (2004) observe that the 2000s witnessed a surge of foreign capital 
inflows to India, but the strategy of reserve accumulation and a managed exchange rate 
with capital controls enabled the monetary authorities to manage the inflow. The increase 
in reserves „was driven by invisibles (remittances and software exports), banking capital 
and other capital‟ (Joshi and Sanyal, 2004: 155). Although the details differ, the scenario 
is similar: after a period of prolonged financial repression, the period since the early 
1990s has been one of gradual liberalisation and increasing foreign exchange inflows in 
Bangladesh and India. 
 
2.3 Pakistan
3
 
The financial sector in Pakistan has been controlled and repressed by the government, 
which compelled the sector to direct credits to preferential agricultural and industrial 
                                               
3  This section is based on Ahmed (2005) and Hussain (2005) 
 12 
projects and also to finance budget deficits. Nominal interest rates were controlled and 
fixed. Although the traded or external sector was relatively liberalised, the capital and 
current accounts were closed and exchange rates were fixed along with stringent financial 
suppression. All banks operating in Pakistan exclusively owned by Pakistani nationals 
were nationalised in 1974 with the objectives of directing bank credits towards the 
preferential sectors or projects ensuring government funding (Patti and Hardy, 2005: 
2384).  Until 1980, financial repression along with restrictions in the external sector and 
the nationalisation of the financial and industrial sectors misallocated scarce national 
resources and created inefficiency. In 1984-90, the efforts were focused to reduce and 
eventually eliminate these subsidies without significant success. 
In the early 1990s, the economy experienced serious economic and financial crisis 
and a substantial decline in foreign reserves which pushed the country several times to a 
point of bankruptcy. It took some efforts to undertake reforms with a wider focus on the 
foreign exchange and trade sector, privatisation and on the financial sector. However, the 
outcomes from these reforms were frustrating, reflected in poor performances of 
economic growth, caused by serious political instability and corruption. In the later half 
of the 1990s, the non-performing loans of the private sector worsened, reaching loan 
defaults of about seven percent of GDP in 1997.  The country also encountered serious 
problems in the external sectors: remittances from nationals working abroad declined and 
the demand for exports fell. The allocation of funds to service external debt increased: 
foreign debt in 1999 was US$28 billion, 44.5 percent of GDP.  
The post-September 11 events gave Pakistan opportunities to become an ally of 
the US-led war against terrorism. Economic sanctions (imposed after it declared itself as a 
nuclear power in 1999) were gradually removed and foreign debts were rescheduled or 
written off. Remittances recovered and foreign exchange reserves reached their highest 
level of US$14 billion in 2003. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved through 
reduction in fiscal deficits, a major and perceptible liberalisation of foreign exchange 
regime, acquiring a surplus on the current account balance of payments, lowering of 
inflation and a transformation of debt profile. The impact of the economic reforms on the 
financial sector is low compared to other neighbouring countries. M3/GDP was stable 
until 2001 and has increased to around 56 percent, compared to 64 percent in India. 
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Liberalisation to date has not significantly affected the economy; of our three countries, 
Pakistan remains the most financially repressed.   
 
3. Theory and Model Specifications 
 
We begin by considering how foreign inflows relate to the money stock. At the risk of 
over-simplification, the balance sheet of a central bank is the sum of net domestic and 
foreign assets which comprise the monetary base and, given the money multiplier, this 
determines the money stock. Assuming the money multiplier is constant (and suppressing 
it), M = NFA + NDA, where M is the change in the money stock, NFA is the 
change in net foreign assets and NDA the change in net domestic assets of the central 
bank. We assume NFA comprises only foreign assets of the central bank and not of the 
whole economy (Fielding, 1996). The NDA comprises net credit to government (NCG) 
by the central bank and other items net (OIN) which may include net loans to commercial 
banks and commercial banks‟ deposits with the central bank. 
 
The impact of NFA on M depends on the extent to which the central bank can 
monetise the inflows of foreign assets or foreign exchange reserves by purchasing and 
providing domestic money, i.e. NDA. The central bank can regulate NFA through open 
market operations by selling and buying foreign exchange reserves or other forms of 
sterilization. This is what India has done since the 1990s, „fixing the nominal exchange 
rate or managing it to resist a market-driven exchange rate appreciation and preventing 
the consequent reserve accumulation from increasing the supply of money‟ (Joshi and 
Sanyal, 2004: 158). The control of the central bank over NDA depends on its ability to 
refuse to monetise or finance budget deficits. Thus, the effect of inflows on money stock 
depends on the accommodation of NFA and management of NDA. In simple terms, 
this can be written as: 
 M = (1-)NFA + NDA (1) 
 
The term )1(   measures the extent of pass-through from foreign exchange (forex) 
receipts to money. If  = 0, the central bank is not able to adjust NDA in response to 
forex inflows (i.e. no sterilisation), there will be a complete pass-through from forex 
 14 
inflows to money, implying NFAM  . On the other hand, if  = 1, the central bank 
can completely adjust NDA to accommodate forex inflows and M = 0 (because NFA = 
-NDA). Thus, the coefficient on NFA in the MDF is in effect a measure of the pass 
through to real money stock. 
 
We augment a standard money demand function (Ericsson, 1998) where real money is a 
function of real income and the real interest rate by including real inflows (all variables 
measured in real terms and all except the interest rate in logs): 
 
 mt = 0 +1 yt + 2 fat + 3 it + t (2) 
where mt is the demand for real balances, yt is real income and fat is real foreign 
exchange inflows (i.e. deflated by prices). In equation (2), 1 measures the long-run 
elasticity between real money and income and is assumed, based on the cash balance 
theory, equal to unity, implying that a rise in real income is completely reflected in the 
rise in real money demand. The coefficient 2 measures the pass-though effect from real 
forex inflows to real money, and may take any value between zero and unity. The 
coefficient 3 measures the long-run semi-interest elasticity of money and is expected to 
be negative as the interest rate captures the opportunity cost of holding money.  
   
We estimate (2) following the method of Gregory and Hansen (1996), henceforth GH, 
who modify the Engle-Granger (1986) approach to testing for the existence of a single 
cointegrating relationship by allowing that the coefficients may be subject to a structural 
break. The timing of the break is not imposed; it is estimated by considering all dates 
within the sample (except the first and last few observations, as tests are known to be very 
sensitive to breaks early or late in the series) as candidates. A structural break is accepted 
if the date produces significant evidence of cointegration, for which the GH procedure 
replaces the critical values appropriate to the standard approach with critical values 
arrived at by Monte Carlo simulation of their modified procedure.  
 Equation (2) is the basis for Engle-Granger tests for cointegration and we term 
this the “standard cointegration model” (SC Model). The GH procedure requires that we 
modify this equation by introducing a dummy variable to indicate the break date, which is 
(for t = 1, 2, …, n and [x] indicates the integer part of x) given by: 
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This dummy variable can be used to model a variety of forms of structural break. We 
consider two of these: a level shift (LS) and a regime shift (RS) of the cointegrating 
equation:  
Model LS: 
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The regime shift model allows for the possibility that the slope coefficients of the 
cointegrating equation break at the same date:  
Model RS: 
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The GH procedure consists of applying one of these models sequentially for all break 
dates within the permitted range of    ntn 85.015.0   and, for each such break date, 
computing a statistic to test the null of no cointegration. If the most extreme value 
obtained for the test statistic
4
 exceeds the GH critical value then we reject the null in 
favour of “cointegration with a structural break”. The benefit of this approach allows us 
to use the data to determine if there is a break and when it occurs. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
We fist investigate univariate time series properties of each series. We follow GH in 
considering only the case where the individual series are I(1) throughout and undergo 
no change on drift rate or any other parameter. Our ADF test results show that all 
series in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan behave as I(1) within the estimation period. 
The results are summarised in tables 1-3. Appendix A contains the data sources and 
descriptions of variables and appendix B contains details of the estimation results. 
                                               
4 We use an ADF t-statistic. GH also provide tables for the  Z and tZ  tests of Phillips (1987). 
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  Table 1: Summary Results for Bangladesh 
         
Table 1a : cointegration between m (m1 & m2) , y, fa, i, prim 
         
SC LS RS 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Model: m1=f(c,y,fa) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa) 
1.16 
(23.61) 
0.02 
(1.02) 
 
1.29
 b
 
(21.68) 
0.05
b
 
(2.20) 
 
1.33
 c
 
(11.56) 
-0.02
 c
 
(-0.69) 
 
Model: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa,i) 
1.15 
(23.20) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.01 
(-1.34) 
1.32
 b
 
(22.73) 
0.03
 b
 
(1.55) 
-0.02
 b
 
(-3.07) 
1.15 
(5.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
Model: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) Model: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) 
1.11 
(13.72) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
-0.08 
(-2.51) 
1.33
 b
 
(14.38) 
0.05
 b
 
(1.69) 
-0.09
 b
 
(-3.35) 
1.33 
(10.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
Model: m2=f(c,y,fa) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa) 
1.77 
(40.59) 
0.11 
(5.48) 
 
1.66 
(43.36) 
0.03 
(5.03) 
 
2.52
b
 
(37.03) 
0.06
b
 
(2.72) 
 
Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) 
1.81
c
 
(54.54) 
0.16
c
 
(9.84) 
0.04
c
 
(9.09) 
1.68 
(48.01) 
0.07 
(4.02) 
0.02 
(2.81) 
2.40
b
 
(18.65) 
0.07
 b
 
(3.10) 
0.01
b
 
(1.10) 
Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) Model: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) 
1.98 
(35.00) 
0.07 
(3.62) 
0.15 
(6.97) 
1.74 
(30.00) 
0.10 
(5.96) 
0.13 
(7.01) 
2.51 
(35.80) 
0.05 
(2.55) 
0.02 
(0.58) 
         
 
 
Notes: Although not strictly valid, OLS t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
The shaded cells highlight cases where the GH procedure suggests 
cointegration at either 5% (superscripted “c”) or 10% (superscripted “b”) 
asymptotic size of test.  
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Table 2: Summary results for India 
Table 1a : cointegration between m (m1 & m2) , y, fa, i, prim 
SC LS RS 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) 
0.94
c
 
(29.96) 
0.04
c
 
(3.06) 
 
0.97
c
 
(34.15) 
0.05
c
 
(3.83) 
 
0.34
 c
 
(3.41) 
-0.07
 c
 
(-1.40) 
 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) 
0.96
c
 
(29.32) 
0.04
c
 
(2.93) 
-0.01
c
 
(-2.14) 
0.96
c
 
(32.79) 
0.05
c
 
(3.84) 
0.001
c
 
(0.40) 
0.39
c
 
(2.56) 
-0.08
c
 
(-1.39) 
-0.01
c
 
(-.44) 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m1 = f(c, y, fa, prim) 
0.95
c
 
(27.68) 
0.05
c
 
(2.64) 
0.08
c
 
(1.22) 
0.98
c
 
(30.17) 
0.05
 c
 
(2.92) 
0.04
c
 
(0.66) 
0.27
b
 
(2.53) 
-0.13
b
 
(-2.14) 
-0.05
b
 
(-0.46) 
Model: m2=f(c, y, fa) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa) 
1.42 
(25.91) 
0.07 
(3.01) 
 
1.20
c
 
(28.41) 
0.06
c
 
(3.66) 
 
0.56
c
 
(5.81) 
0.28
c
 
(8.92) 
 
Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) 
1.33 
(24.92) 
0.08 
(3.58) 
0.02 
(5.11) 
1.28
c
 
(29.65) 
0.03
 c
 
(1.77) 
-0.01
 c
 
(-0.93) 
0.31
c
 
(2.53) 
0.26
c
 
(8.76) 
0.03
c
 
(3.00) 
Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) 
1.44 
(25.67) 
0.10 
(3.50) 
-0.09 
(-0.88) 
1.20
c
 
(24.95) 
0.05
c
 
(2.14) 
-0.13
c
 
(-1.67) 
0.55
c
 
(5.39) 
0.27
c
 
(7.73) 
-0.08
c
 
(-1.05) 
 
Table 3: Summary results for Pakistan 
Table 1a : cointegration between m (m1 & m2) , y, fa, i, prim 
SC LS RS 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa) 
0.88
c
 
(48.58) 
0.04
c
 
(2.06) 
 
0.93
c
 
(44.64) 
0.04
c
 
(2.15) 
 
0.78
 c
 
(7.39) 
0.02
 c
 
(0.28) 
 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) 
0.94
c
 
(39.72) 
0.02
c
 
(1.31) 
-0.01
c
 
(-4.11) 
0.97
c
 
(40.15) 
0.03
c
 
(1.54) 
-0.01
c
 
(-3.05) 
0.81
c
 
(6.31) 
0.01
c
 
(0.11) 
-0.02
c
 
(-0.41) 
Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m1=f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m1 = f(c, y, fa, prim) 
0.91
c
 
(35.99) 
0.03
c
 
(1.08) 
0.10
c
 
(1.57) 
0.99
c
 
(36.56) 
0.04
 c
 
(1.53) 
-0.09
c
 
(-1.31) 
0.75
c
 
(18.76) 
0.05
c
 
(1.31) 
0.08
c
 
(1.35) 
Model: m2=f(c, y, fa) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa) 
1.03 
(58.06) 
0.02 
(1.44) 
 
1.07
c
 
(56.25) 
0.03
c
 
(1.75) 
 
1.11
c
 
(10.97) 
0.003
c
 
(0.4) 
 
Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, i) 
1.03
b
 
(43.19) 
0.02
b
 
(1.17) 
-0.004
b
 
(-1.30) 
1.06
c
 
(47.79) 
0.03
 c
 
(2.09) 
0.002
 c
 
(0.74) 
1.38
c
 
(24.79) 
0.05
c
 
(1.75) 
-0.09
c
 
(-10.55) 
Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) Model: m2 = f(c, y, fa, prim) 
1.02
c
 
(48.22) 
0.02
 c
 
(1.02) 
0.19
 c
 
(3.66) 
1.06
c
 
(45.15) 
0.03
c
 
(1.46) 
0.06
c
 
(0.93) 
0.99
c
 
(23.37) 
-0.01
c
 
(-0.31) 
0.13
c
 
(1.91) 
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Our empirical results show that the money demand has generally a long-run relationship 
(i.e. is cointegrated) with real income (y), real foreign assets (fa) and (nominal) interest 
rates (i). The signs and magnitudes of most of the coefficients are as expected and 
economically plausible. Our empirical modelling reveals that the monetary policy in 
Bangladesh went through a structural break in 1990, i.e. the break year is 1990 (1989q4) 
which is consistent with the policy change started from 1990. The break years in Pakistan 
are 1971 and 1975, which are consistent with the civil way in 1971 and a major rise in 
prices in 1975. The structural break years for India vary which may warrant further 
thorough investigation of the impact of major policy change and other external shocks 
including the war with Pakistan in 1965 and droughts in 1977 and 1978 and changes in 
monetary policy since the 1990s.  
Results for Pakistan reveal that both M1 and M2, for all specifications except one  
(SC: m2 = f(c, y, fa)), for the three models (SC, LS and RS) are cointegrated with y, fa 
and i at a 5% level of significance. In India, cointegrated relationships for M1 as a 
dependent variable are found in all specifications; while models for M2 are cointegrated 
for level and regime shift specifications, but not for SC. The results are less decisive for 
Bangladesh since some models reveal cointegrated relationship while others do not. For 
example, the models for M1 of all specifications with level shifts offer cointegrated 
relationships at a 10% level of significance. Results on Bangladesh also show that the 
following specifications gave cointegrated relationships: RS: m1=f(c, y, fa), SC: m2=f(c, 
y, fa, i), RS: m2=f(c, y, fa) and m2 = f(c, y, fa, i).         
The coefficient of y (1) is positive as expected and statistically significant. The 
values of 1 in models for M1 in India and Pakistan are less than one while they are more 
than one in models for M2. In India, the range of 1 in models for M1 with cointegrated 
relationships is 0.27-0.96. The values in SC and LS models are 0.94-0.98, which are 
economically more plausible than the values in RS models, which are somewhat lower: 
0.27-0.39. In Pakistan, the values of 1 are within range of 0.78-0.99, which are 
economically plausible. The values of 1 in Bangladesh, when cointegrated relationships 
are found, are within range 1.29-2.52, which are significantly greater than one but much 
lower and more economically plausible than the values obtained by Hossain (1996) and 
Siddiki (2000a): 1 in Siddiki (2000a) is 3.26 and in Hossain (1996) within the range of 
2.64-3.96.  
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The values of 1 in models with M2 as a dependent variable in all three countries 
are higher than one, which is economically less plausible and not sustainable in the long-
run. The high magnitude of 1 is the result of many factors (Siddiki, 2000a: 1982). 
Firstly, the high growth rates of money demand relative to the growth of income. This 
difference between the growth of real money demand and real income is reflected in the 
high rate of inflation. Secondly, the economy is under-monetised. A rise in the growth of 
bank branches has been increasing the monetisation of the economy and the saving 
behaviour of the people. Finally, the scarcity of alternative domestic financial assets and 
the strong distrust in them induces people to use money as the main asset in their 
portfolios. 
The coefficients (2) of real foreign assets (fa) are generally positive and 
statistically significant in the three countries. 2 = (1-) measures the extent of pass-
through effects from real foreign exchange inflows to real money. The magnitudes of 2 
are very low, ranging from 0.04-0.28.  Lower values of 2 imply higher values for , i.e. a 
lower level of pass-through implies greater ability for the central bank (or government) to 
adjust net domestic assets in order to accommodate the increase in foreign currency 
inflows. These results highlight the fact that none of the countries in our sample are 
economically vulnerable to external monetary shocks. This finding is consistent with the 
fact that Bangladesh, India are Pakistan were unaffected by economic crisis in Asian 
countries in 1997.    
The impact of interest rates (i) on the demand for money is very small. The low values 
of interest rate coefficients are consistent with the fact that interest rates in our sample 
countries have been controlled and rigid for very long periods of time and they alone are 
unable to generate notable influences on saving, investment and real income in these 
countries. The directions or signs of the impact of the interest rate on the demand for 
money vary depending on the measurements of the demand for money. The interest rate 
in Bangladesh and India generally positively affects the demand for broad money (M2) 
(i.e. i is considered as returns to financial assets or saving such as time deposits in M2) 
and generally negatively affects the demand for narrow money (M1) in all three countries 
(i.e. i is considered as costs of holding money for transaction purposes). These results 
may imply that the interest rate encourage financial saving such as time deposit (a 
component of M2) and discourages people in holding cash money such as M1.   
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The coefficients on unofficial exchange rate premiums in all three countries are small, 
implying a small effect of foreign exchange rate policy on the demand for money. This 
finding is consistent with our finding above that domestic economies are less vulnerable 
to external shocks. The black exchange rate premiums in Bangladesh and India negatively 
affect the demand for money.  The increase in premiums occurs when the demand for 
foreign exchange is higher than the supply of forex. The increase in premiums also 
signals the overvaluation of domestic money and induces investors to believe that 
domestic currencies would be devalued in the recent future (Siddiki, 2000a: 1982). Thus, 
agents change the assets in their portfolios in favour of foreign assets. The coefficient of 
unofficial premiums in Pakistan is positive which is counterintuitive and warrants further 
investigation.       
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we estimated the demand for money in three south Asian countries 
namely Bangladesh, India and Pakistan using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) method of 
single equation cointegration analyses with regime shifts. Our empirical results reveal that 
the income elasticity of money is positive and yields plausible coefficients mostly close to 
unity, justifying the incorporation of regime shifts in single equation cointegration 
analyses. We also find that the pass-through effects of foreign capital inflows are low; the 
governments or the central banks of these countries have the ability to adjust net domestic 
assets in response to currency inflows. The results also imply that unofficial exchange 
rate premiums have little impact on the demand for money, highlighting the fact again 
that these countries have sufficient control of their monetary policies to protect 
themselves from external shocks. The impact of unofficial exchange rate premiums in 
Bangladesh and India is negative, reflecting the overvaluation of domestic currency, 
which induces investors to change the assets in their portfolios in favour of foreign assets. 
The results reveal that the impact of interest rates on the demand for money is very 
small and the signs of its impact vary depending on the measurement of the demand for 
money. The very small coefficient reflects rigid and controlled monetary policy in 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan and highlights the fact that the interest rate alone is 
unable to generate a significant impact on saving, investment and real income in these 
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countries.  That is, other variables must be used in conjunction with the interest rate for 
effective monetary policy.  
Although we find some evidence of structural breaks or regime shifts, the MDF has 
been reasonably stable in these three South Asian countries since the 1970s. Because of 
controls and financial repression, interest rates have a negligible effect on money demand. 
Our main finding is that the pass-through rate of foreign exchange is very low, implying 
that these countries can adjust to inflows and protect the monetary sector from external 
shocks. 
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Appendix A 
 
Data Descriptions and sources  
 
m1 = logarithm of real narrow money supply;  
m2 = logarithm of real broad supply; 
y = logarithm of real gdp; 
fa = logarithm of real foreign assets; 
GDP deflator with base 2000 is used to derive real gdp; consumer price index with base 2000 is 
used for m1, m2, fa; i is central bank‟s discount rates. 
All data are collected from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistical 
Yearbook.  
Quarterly figures for GDP are not available and obtained by minimising the square differences 
between the successive quarterly values subject to the constraint that the sum of the quarterly 
totals should equal to the sum of (available) yearly totals (Boot et al. (1967)). The performance of 
this type of interpolation is better than other newly available methods (Chan (1993)). 
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Appendix B 
 
Table A1:  
 
Unit Toot tests or ADF statistics (Check) 
 
       
 Bangladesh: 1974- 2003 India: 1960 - 2004 Pakistan: 1960 - 2004 
Variables Levels First difference  Levels First difference  Levels First difference  
m1 -0.478 (2) -3.214(1)**** 2.207 (2) -5.81(1)**** 0.865 (2) -4.747**** 
M2 -0.454 (2) -3.555(1)**** 1.409(1) -4.427(1)**** 0.504(1) -5.511(1)**** 
Y 3.705(2) -5.145(1)**** 1.948(1) -5.068(1)**** -0.782(1) -5.246(1)**** 
fa -1.298(2) -4.533(1)**** 0.255(1) -3.467(1)**** 0.127(1) -4.765(1)**** 
i -2.207 (1)*** -3.225(1)**** -1.772(1)** -3.119(1)**** -1.812(1)** -3.562(1)**** 
       
       
*    => sig at upper 10%; **   => sig at lower 10%; ***  => sig at upper 5%;**** => sig at lower 1%; using Table 
1 in appendix to Charemza & Deadman (1997);  
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Table A2: Empirical results (Bangladesh) of the Gregory Hansen (1996) procedures 
      Sample: 1976Q1:2003Q2 in models without prim; nob = 111; Sample: 1976Q1:1999q2 in models with prim; nob=94 
Model specifications 1  1 1    1 2 3 41 51 61 Break year ADF R
2
 DW 
SC: m1=f(c,y,fa) -3.47*** 
(-7.57) 
 1.16*** 
(23.61) 
0.02 
(1.02) 
     -3.24 0.94 0.44 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa) -5.45*** 
(-7.84) 
-0.14*** 
(-3.65) 
1.29*** 
(21.68) 
0.05** 
(2.20) 
    1989Q4 -4.68* 0.94 0.54 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa) -5.16*** 
(- 4.17) 
-2.01 
(-1.32) 
1.33*** 
(11.56) 
-0.02 
(-0.69) 
 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.16*** 
(3.47) 
 1989Q4 -5.96** 0.96 0.72 
SC: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) -3.15*** 
(-6.08) 
 1.15*** 
(23.20) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
-0.01 
(-1.34) 
    -3.30 0.94 0.45 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) -5.35*** 
(-7.99) 
-0.19*** 
(-4.66) 
1.32*** 
(22.73) 
0.03 
(1.55) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.07) 
   1989Q4 5.16* 0.96 0.76 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) -3.26 
(-1.36) 
1.01 
(0.33) 
1.15*** 
(5.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
-0.02 
(-0.6) 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
-.08*** 
(-2.86) 
1989Q4 -5.47 0.96 0.76 
SC: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) -2.82*** 
(-3.58) 
 1.11*** 
(13.72) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
-0.08** 
(-2.51) 
    -3.20 0.90 0.45 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) -5.80*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.10) 
1.33*** 
(14.38) 
0.05 
(1.69) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.35) 
   1989Q4 -5.26* 0.92 0.62 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) -5.17*** 
(-3.64) 
11.30 
(1.93) 
1.33*** 
(10.54) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.85** 
(-2.10) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.47 
(-2.66) 
1989Q4 -5.54 0.92 0.75 
Critical values (CVs) with two regressors (without intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=125)): - 4.68 (at lower 1% level of 
significance); - 3.68 (at upper 5% level of significance); -3.33 (at upper 10% level of significance); CVs with three regressors (without 
intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=125)): - 4.63 (at lower 1% level of significance); - 3.90 (at upper 5% level of 
significance); -3.59 (at upper 10% level of significance); critical values with two (three) regressor and structural breaks : at 1% level of 
significance: LS = -5.44 (-5.77), LST = -5.80 (-6.05), RS = -5.97 (-6.51): at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92 (-5.28), LST = -5.29 (-
5.57), RS = -5.50 (-6.00): at 10% level of significance: LS = -4.69(-5.02), LST = -5.03(-5.33), RS = -5.23(-5.75); *** - significant at the 
1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level, * - significant at the 10% level 
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Table A2 (continued): Empirical results (Bangladesh) of the Gregory Hansen (1996) procedures 
 
Sample: 1976Q1:2003Q2 in models without prim; nob = 111; Sample: 1976Q1:1999q2 in models with prim; nob=94 
Model specifications 1  1 1    1 2 3 41 51 61 Break year ADF R
2
 DW 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa) -11.24*** 
(-27.56) 
 1.77*** 
(40.59) 
0.11*** 
(5.48) 
     -2.77 0.98 0.40 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa) -9.69*** 
(-24.80) 
0.18*** 
(7.53) 
1.66*** 
(43.36) 
0.08** 
(5.03) 
    1982Q1 -4.58 0.98 0.71 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa) -20.12*** 
(-27.52) 
11.98*** 
(13.33) 
2.52*** 
(37.03) 
0.06*** 
(2.72) 
 -0.94*** 
(-12.02) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
 1989q4 -5.80** 0.99 1.21 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -12.73*** 
(-36.51) 
 1.81*** 
(54.54) 
0.16*** 
(9.84) 
0.04*** 
(9.09) 
    -3.79** 0.99 0.79 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -9.91*** 
(-19.40) 
0.19*** 
(6.74) 
1.68*** 
(48.01) 
0.07*** 
(4.02) 
0.02*** 
(2.81) 
   1982Q3 -4.40 0.99 1.10 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -18.81*** 
(-13.81) 
14.56*** 
(8.56) 
2.40*** 
(18.65) 
0.07*** 
(3.10) 
0.01 
(1.10) 
-0.98*** 
(-7.07) 
-0.14*** 
(-3.40) 
-.06*** 
(-3.86) 
1989Q4 -5.46* 0.99 1.49 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) -13.61*** 
(-24.56) 
 1.98*** 
(35.00) 
0.07*** 
(3.62) 
0.15*** 
(6.97) 
    -2.53 0.98 0.72 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) -10.88*** 
(-18.23) 
0.15*** 
(6.94) 
1.74*** 
(30.00) 
0.10*** 
(5.96) 
0.13*** 
(7.01) 
   1981q1 -4.60 0.99 1.13 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa, prim) -19.91*** 
(-25.31) 
21.68*** 
(6.70) 
2.51*** 
(35.80) 
0.05** 
(2.55) 
0.02 
(0.58) 
-1.63*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.06 
(-1.31) 
-.26*** 
(2.70) 
1989q4 -5.15 0.99 1.50 
Critical values (CVs) with two regressors (without intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=125)): - 4.68 (at lower 1% level of 
significance); - 3.68 (at upper 5% level of significance); -3.33 (at upper 10% level of significance); CVs with three regressors (without 
intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=125)): - 4.63 (at lower 1% level of significance); - 3.90 (at upper 5% level of 
significance); -3.59 (at upper 10% level of significance); critical values with two (three) regressor and structural breaks : at 1% level of 
significance: LS = -5.44 (-5.77), LST = -5.80 (-6.05), RS = -5.97 (-6.51): at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92 (-5.28), LST = -5.29 (-
5.57), RS = -5.50 (-6.00): at 10% level of significance: LS = -4.69(-5.02), LST = -5.03(-5.33), RS = -5.23(-5.75); *** - significant at the 
1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level, * - significant at the 10% level 
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Table A2: Empirical results (India) of the Gregory Hansen (1996) procedures 
 
Sample: 1960Q2:2004Q4 in models without prim; nob = 176 
Model specifications 1  1 1    1 2 3 41 51 61 Break year ADF R
2
 DW 
SC: m1=f(c, y, fa) -0.23 
(-1.35) 
 0.94*** 
(29.96) 
0.04*** 
(3.06) 
     -4.51** 0.98 0.80 
LS: m1=f(c, y, fa) -0.38** 
(-2.511) 
-0.12*** 
(-6.67) 
0.97*** 
(34.15) 
0.05*** 
(3.83) 
    1966Q3 -5.89*** 0.99 1.00 
RS: m1=f(c, y, fa) 4.34*** 
(6.30) 
-4.83*** 
(-6.84) 
0.34*** 
(3.41) 
-0.07 
(-1.40) 
 0.63*** 
(6.01) 
0.11** 
(2.18) 
 1996Q3 -6.18*** 0.99 1.12 
SC: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) -0.32* 
(-1.87) 
 0.96*** 
(29.52) 
0.04*** 
(2.93) 
-0.01** 
(-2.14) 
    -4.62*** 0.98 0.82 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) -0.37** 
(-2.36) 
-0.12*** 
(-6.23) 
0.96*** 
(32.79) 
0.05*** 
(3.84) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
   1966Q3 -5.90*** 0.99 1.00 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) 4.11*** 
(4.72) 
-4.61*** 
(-5.21) 
0.39** 
(2.56) 
-0.08 
(-1.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
0.59*** 
(3.75) 
0.11** 
(1.99) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
1970Q2 -6.33*** 0.99 1.13 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa) -3.27*** 
(-11.14) 
 1.42*** 
(25.91) 
0.07*** 
(3.00) 
     -2.61 0.98 0.44 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa) -1.75*** 
(-7.33) 
0.34 1.20*** 
(28.41) 
0.06*** 
(3.66) 
    1978Q2 -5.51*** 0.99 0.94 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa) 1.84*** 
(3.20) 
-3.82*** 
(-6.14) 
0.56*** 
(5.81) 
0.28*** 
(8.92) 
 0.75*** 
(7.16) 
-0.27*** 
(-7.44) 
 1978Q3 -8.83*** 0.99 1.23 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -2.90*** 
(-10.21) 
 1.33*** 
(24.92) 
0.08*** 
(3.58) 
0.02*** 
(5.11) 
    -3.06 0.98 0.52 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -2.06*** 
(-8.61) 
0.34*** 
(10.13) 
1.26*** 
(29.20) 
0.04** 
(2.22) 
-0.00 
(-0.74) 
   1977Q2 -7.10*** 0.99 0.90 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) 3.42*** 
(4.46) 
-5.31*** 
(-6.61) 
0.31** 
(2.53) 
0.26*** 
(8.76) 
0.03*** 
(3.00) 
1.01*** 
(7.70) 
-0.27*** 
(-7.54) 
-.05*** 
(-3.55) 
1978Q3 -8.85*** 0.99 1.40 
Critical values (CVs) with two regressors (without intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.71 (at lower 1% level of 
significance); - 3.67 (at upper 5% level of significance); -3.33 (at upper 10% level of significance); CVs with three regressors (without 
intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.61 (at lower 1% level of significance); - 3.88 (at upper 5% level of 
significance); -3.58 (at upper 10% level of significance); Critical values with two (three) regressor and structural breaks : at 1% level of 
significance: LS = -5.44 (-5.77), LST = -5.80 (-6.05), RS = -5.97 (-6.51): at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92 (-5.28), LST = -5.29 (-
5.57), RS = -5.50 (-6.00): at 10% level of significance: LS = -4.69(-5.02), LST = -5.03(-5.33), RS = -5.23(-5.75); *** - significant at the 
1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level, * - significant at the 10% level 
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Table A3: Empirical results (Pakistan) of the Gregory Hansen (1996) procedures 
Sample: 1960Q3:2004Q4 in models without prim; nob = 175; Sample: 1960Q3:1993q4 in models with prim; nob=135 
Model specifications 1  1 1    1 2 3 41 51 61 Break 
year 
ADF R
2
 DW 
SC: m1=f(c, y, fa) 1.17*** 
(8.32) 
 0.88*** 
(48.58) 
0.04** 
(2.06) 
     -4.75*** 0.97 0.26 
LS: m1=f(c, y, fa) 0.58*** 
(3.11) 
-0.12*** 
(-4.49) 
0.93*** 
(44.64) 
0.04** 
(2.15) 
    1971q3 -6.24*** 0.97 0.31 
RS: m1=f(c, y, fa) 2.55 
(1.30) 
-2.42 
(-1.22) 
0.78*** 
(7.39) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
 0.20 
(1.82) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
 1972q2 -6.29*** 0.98 0.34 
SC: m1=f(c, y, fa, i) 0.59*** 
(3.01) 
 0.94*** 
(39.72) 
0.02 
(1.31) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.11) 
    -5.10*** 0.97 0.30 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) 0.26 
(1.25) 
-0.09*** 
(3.53) 
0.97*** 
(40.15) 
0.03 
(1.54) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.05) 
   1971q2 -6.28*** 0.97 0.33 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa, i) 2.41 
(1.24) 
-2.59 
(-1.33) 
0.81*** 
(6.31) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
0.22 
(1.65) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
1972Q1 -6.42** 0.98 0.37 
SC: m1=f(c, y, fa, prim) 0.79** 
(2.05) 
 0.91*** 
(35.99) 
0.03 
(1.08) 
0.10 
(1.57) 
    -4.33** 0.95 0.24 
LS: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) -0.03 
(-0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(-5.27) 
0.99*** 
(36.56) 
0.04 
(1.53) 
-0.09 
(-1.31) 
   1972Q1 -5.90 0.96 0.34 
RS: m1=f(c,y,fa, prim) 2.50*** 
(3.29) 
-5.61*** 
(-6.05) 
0.75*** 
(18.76) 
0.05 
(1.31) 
0.08 
(1.35) 
0.49*** 
(8.36) 
-0.06 
(-1.10) 
0.15 
(1.15) 
1975Q4 -6.29 0.98 0.51 
Critical values (CVs) with two regressors (without intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.71 (at lower 1% level of 
significance); - 3.67 (at upper 5% level of significance); -3.33 (at upper 10% level of significance); CVs with three regressors (without 
intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.61 (CHECK) (at lower 1% level of significance); - 3.88 (at upper 5% level of 
significance); -3.58 (at upper 10% level of significance); Critical values with two (three) regressor and structural breaks : at 1% level of 
significance: LS = -5.44 (-5.77), RS = -5.97 (-6.51): at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92 (-5.28), RS = -5.50 (-6.00): at 10% level of 
significance: LS = -4.69(-5.02), RS = -5.23(-5.75); *** - significant at the 1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level, * - significant at the 
10% level 
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Table A3 (continued): Empirical results (Pakistan) of the Gregory Hansen (1996) procedures 
 
Sample: 1960Q3:2000Q4 in models without prim; nob = 175; Sample: 1960Q3:1996q4 in models with prim; nob=135 
Model 
specifications 
1  1 1    1 2 3 41 51 61 Break 
year 
ADF R
2
 DW 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa) 0.09 
(0.65) 
 1.01*** 
(58.06) 
0.02 
(1.44) 
     -3.31 0.98 0.19 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa) -0.66*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.14*** 
(-6.08) 
1.07*** 
(56.25) 
0.03 
(1.75) 
    1971Q4 -7.30*** 0.99 0.24 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa) -0.91 
(-0.48) 
0.17 
(0.09) 
1.11*** 
(10.97) 
0.003 
(0.4) 
 -0.06 
(-0.58) 
0.04 
(0.50) 
 1971Q4 -7.22*** 0.98 0.52 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) 0.10 
(-0.49) 
 1.03*** 
(43.19) 
0.02 
(1.17) 
-0.004 
(-1.30) 
    -3.36* 0.98 0.19 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -0.64*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.16*** 
(-6.30) 
1.06*** 
(47.79) 
0.03** 
(2.09) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
   1972Q2 -7.29*** 0.99 0.28 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa, i) -4.14*** 
(-5.16) 
3.46*** 
(4.16) 
1.38*** 
(24.79) 
0.05 
(1.75) 
-0.09*** 
(-10.55) 
-0.37*** 
(-6.07) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.10*** 
(11.34) 
1978Q3 -7.43*** 0.99 0.41 
SC: m2=f(c,y,fa, 
prim) 
-0.16 
(-0.48) 
 1.02*** 
(48.22) 
0.02 
(1.02) 
0.19*** 
(3.66) 
    -5.28*** 0.97 0.30 
LS: m2=f(c,y,fa, 
prim) 
-0.66 
(-1.94) 
-0.13*** 
(-3.58) 
1.06*** 
(45.14) 
0.03 
(1.46) 
0.06 
(0.93) 
   1972Q2 -7.29*** 0.97 0.30 
RS: m2=f(c,y,fa, 
prim) 
0.59 
(0.74) 
-2.43** 
(-2.47) 
0.99*** 
(23.37) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
0.13 
(1.91) 
0.11 
(1.79) 
0.09 
(1.70) 
-0.07 
(-0.61) 
1975Q3 -7.34*** 0.98 0.34 
Critical values (CVs) with two regressors (without intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.71 (at lower 1% level 
of significance); - 3.67 (at upper 5% level of significance); -3.33 (at upper 10% level of significance); CVs with three regressors (without 
intercept) and without structural breaks ((nobs=175)): - 4.61 (at lower 1% level of significance); - 3.88 (at upper 5% level of significance); 
-3.58 (at upper 10% level of significance); Critical values with two (three) regressor and structural breaks : at 1% level of significance: LS 
= -5.44 (-5.77), RS = -5.97 (-6.51): at 5% level of significance: LS = -4.92 (-5.28), RS = -5.50 (-6.00): at 10% level of significance: LS = -
4.69(-5.02), RS = -5.23(-5.75); *** - significant at the 1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level, * - significant at the 10% level 
